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FAIRNESS IN RATE CUTS IN THE INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX*
Alan L. Feldt
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (the 1981 Act) made significant changes in federal income, estate, and gift taxation, touching
virtually every taxpayer.' The centerpiece of the 1981 Act consisted of
rate reductions in the individual income tax.2 These reductions, said to
average 23%, served a number of different but related objectives. First,
those in favor of the tax cuts posited that all taxpayers would benefit
from equitable, across-the-board reductions in an excessive and growing
tax burden.3 Related to this objective was an anticipated reduction in
the size of the federal government, because less tax money would be
available to finance federal spending. 4 Second, supporters of rate reductions focused on the effect of federal taxes on incentives 5 and argued
that a cut in marginal tax rates would lead to an increase in productivity. 6 Third, marginal rate reductions would offset both the recently en*
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Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I would like to thank Clayton
Gillette, Michael Melton, Michael O'Hare, Aviam Soifer, and David Terkla who read earlier
drafts of this article and made helpful suggestions. My thanks also to my research assistant,
Marc Rosenberg.
1 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
2
I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1981). In addition to rate reductions, the 1981 Act made significant alterations in the income tax base. See, e.g., id §§ 168 (accelerated cost recovery in lieu of
conventional depreciation), 168((8) (safe-harbor leasing), 128 (all savers certificates, a new
form of savings with exempt interest), 221 (deduction for married couples to alleviate the socalled marriage penalty). Although changes in the tax base have important effects on the
taxation of individuals, this article will focus primarily on the rate reductions. See infra note
10.
3 The Senate Finance Committee felt that the rate reductions would "lower personal
tax burdens, and restrain the growth of the Federal Government." S. REP. No. 144, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
4
"The committee believes that its program of tax reductions will increase the likelihood that Federal spending will be restrained over an extended period of time. . . " Id
5
High marginal tax rates probably exert considerable influence on economically productive decisionmaking. Higher taxes arguably will cause people to alter their savings-consumption or work-leisure decisions from what they would be absent tax considerations. See
in/fa notes 74-75.
6 The Senate Finance Committee stated:
[T]hese marginal rate reductions will accomplish two important goals of the
economic recovery program. First, they provide equitable across-the-board
relief from the excessive and steadily growing tax burden that is imposed
under current law. Second, they reduce the distortions, inefficiencies and disincentives that result from the current high level of marginal tax rates.
SENATE REPORT, su/ra note 3, at 23, reprintedin 1981-2 C.B. 413.
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acted increases in the social security tax 7 and the effects of inflation. 8
By contrast, considerations traditionally highlighted in connection
with income tax changes played only a minor role in structuring the
1981 Act rate reductions. Little was heard of the virtues of progressivity
in the income tax, of the role of federal tax policy in achieving redistribution of income, or of fairness to low- and moderate-income families.
Proceeding from a historical perspective, this article sets the important changes wrought by the 1981 Act against the backdrop of another
important transitional period, 1940 to 1945. Part I describes the
changes in rates and certain other structural elements of the income tax
between 1939 and 1979. Part II develops four criteria for analyzing the
impact of rate changes: (1) changes in marginal rates; (2) changes in
effective rates; (3) changes in after-tax income; and (4) changes in discretionary income. Part III discusses the 1981 Act changes and evaluates
those changes under the four criteria. Finally, Part IV applies the four
criteria in a comparison of the 1939, 1979, and 19849 tax schedules.
The article concludes that the Act fell far short of the equity rhetoric that surrounded it. The focus on problems of high inflation and low
productivity to the exclusion of other concerns led the 1981 Act to reallocate many of the burdens of the tax system down the income scale,
rather than equitably reducing the tax burden on all taxpayers. In addition, the Act will turn many individuals whose incomes fall below subsistence levels into new taxpayers. These effects of the 1981 Act alter
some of the nearly forty years of experience that date from the World
War II income tax changes.

7
Prior increases in social security taxes, needed to provide funds to keep the system
solvent, had led to a greater overall tax burden for most taxpayers. See Social Security Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 101(a)(1), 91 Stat. 1509, 1510-11.
8 Sensitivity to the effects of inflation pervaded the tax debate. Popular discussion emphasized the phenomenon of "bracket creep," whereby adjustments in income to meet inflation lead to greater than proportional increases in income tax under a progressive tax rate
structure. After-tax income in real dollars thus declines for a taxpayer whose economic wellbeing otherwise remains unchanged.
The Committee on Ways and Means stated:
[A]n automatic income tax increase is occurring as inflation pulls taxpayers
into higher brackets while diluting the real value of the personal exemption,
the zero bracket amount and other fixed dollar parameters in the existing tax
law. The committee believes that an equitable tax reduction is needed, sufficient in every income class, insofar as it is feasible, to offset these tax increases,
so that the proportion of household income that is paid in individual income
and employee social security taxes is no higher than it was in 1980.
H. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1981). See infra Section IIIA (discussing various
methods of accounting for the effects of inflation on tax rate schedules).
9 The 1981 Act changes are to be fully phased in by 1984. I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1981).
The article thus addresses the rate reductions in their first year of full implementation. See
inra Section IV.
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I
THE HISTORICAL CHANGES

A.

Changes in Individual Tax Rates 10 from 1939 to 1979

The United States' entry into World War II prompted a major restructuring of domestic taxes. The government needed to increase revenues to finance the war effort; simultaneously, it had to keep domestic
buying power in check to control inflation. Higher individual income
taxes helped achieve both objectives.
In 1939, total federal tax revenues were $5.2 billion." The individual income tax and the corporate income tax accounted for $1 billion
and $1.2 billion respectively; the balance came largely from excise and
employment taxes. 12 In 1945 the federal government collected $43.8 billion, a more than eightfold increase. 13 Increases in individual and corporate income tax generated much of the new revenue; in 1945 they
accounted for $19 billion and $16 billion respectively. ' 4 Individual income taxes thus grew from 19.2% of revenues in 1939 to 43.4% of revenues in 1945 and from 1.1% of the gross national product to 9.0% in that
same period. 15
The most obvious World War II change was a general increase in
10 The focus here on the individual income tax rates is not intended to obviate the
important effects of other elements in the tax structure. The rates in the schedule determine
the effect of the individual income tax only in part. Erosions in the tax base and special rates
for certain kinds of income help determine the level and incidence of the tax. Exemptions,
deferral of income, acceleration of deductions, and the special treatment of capital gains, all
can have important effects on an individual's tax liability. Tax provisions that have these
effects receive much attention in the literature, however, while fundamental elements of the
tax laws tend to be taken as givens, including the shape and magnitude of the nominal rate
schedule. But see Klein, A Proposalto Sirmpli the Income Ta Rate Struaure, 1964 Wis. L. REv.
539.
In order to make a closer comparison of the rate schedules for individuals in 1939 and
1979, and thus evaluate the impact of rate schedules on the tax system, this article lays to one
side changes in the base. This approach also ignores rate changes that are expressed as
changes in the base. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 51 (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 6013) (joint
return filing provision). Similarly, to avoid the difficult questions concerning the proper
taxable entity within the family, this article deals chiefly with individuals rather than with
family units. For a fuller discussion of these issues see Bittker, FederalIncome Taxation and the
Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975); McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simpliftd Income Tax, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1573 (1977).
11

STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1969, at 50, table

10 (1970).
12
13

Id at 46, table 10.
Id at 50, table 10. In contrast, over the same period, the GNP doubled from $90.5
billion in 1939 to $211.9 billion in 1945. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 PART 1, ser. F 47-70, at 229 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as HISTORICAL STATISTICS 1970 PART 1].
14

U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,

COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 PART 2, ser. Y 358-373, at 1107 [hereinafter cited as HISTORICAL
STATISTICS 1970 PART 2].
15 See supra note 13.
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individual income tax rates. In 1939 the individual income tax con16
sisted of two parts, a normal tax of 4% applicable to all net income
and a surtax imposed on net income in excess of $4,000.17 The surtax
ranged from 4% at the bottom of the scale to 75% on net income exceeding $5 million. 18 During the war years, the surtax exemption disappeared, so that the surtax applied even on net incomes under $4,000.19
In addition, the surtax began at higher rates and the spaces between
brackets narrowed. By 1944, the normal tax was 3% and the surtax
ranged from 20% on the first dollar of net income to 91% on net incomes
exceeding $200,000.20 The result of these changes was a steeper rate
structure imposing higher rates at every income level.
After World War II, the rates did not revert to their earlier levels.
The Cold War and the United States military involvement in Korea
required a continued high level of federal taxation. Congress did not
reduce the marginal tax rates until the mid-1960s, when the top rate fell
from 91% to 70% of taxable income, and the bottom rate from 20% to
14%.21

In 1979, the base year from which this article compares the 1981
16
I.R.C. § 11 (1939). Net income consisted ofgross income less deductions. Id § 21(a).
The term adjusted gross income entered the tax lexicon only in 1944, when the development
of the standard deduction required a new term for gross income less business deductions.
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, § 8(a), 58 Stat. 231, 235-36 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 22(n) (1939)). The 1954 Code introduced the term "taxable income." I.R.C. § 63 (1954).
17 I.R.C. § 12(b) (1939). The 1939 Code defined surtax net income as "the amount of
net income in excess of the credits against net income provided in section 25(b)." Id § 12(a).
Section 25(b) provided credits against net income for the personal exemption and for dependents. These credits against net income had the effect of deductions and differed from credits
against the tax liability itself.
18 Id § 12(b).
19 For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1941, the surtax was imposed on the
first dollar of surtax net income. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 103, 56 Stat. 798, 802-03
(codified at I.R.C. § 12(b) (1939)).
During the war years, the income tax structure underwent a number of war related and
temporary changes. The Defense Tax, which had the effect of increasing the amount of tax
owed for most taxpayers by 10%, was enacted in 1940. See Revenue Act of 1940, ch. 419,
§ 201, 54 Stat. 516, 520 (codified at I.R.C. § 15), amendedby Second Revenue Act of 1940, ch.
757, § 101(d), 54 Stat. 974. The Defense Tax was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1941, ch.
412, § 104(a), 55 Stat. 687, 693.
The Revenue Act of 1942 introduced the 5% Victory Tax. Ch. 619, § 172(a), 56 Stat.
798, 884 (codified at I.R.C. § 450). For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1942, the
Victory Tax was applied to victory tax net income in excess of a $624 exemption. The 1939
Code defined victory tax net income as gross income (not including gain from the sale or
exchange of capital assets, certain amounts of interest, and certain amounts received as compensation for injury or sickness) less specified deductions allowable under I.R.C. § 23. Id
(codified at I.R.C. §§ 451, 452). The Victory Tax was repealed by the Individual Income
Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, § 6(a), 58 Stat. 231, 234.
20
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 10, §§ 3,4(a), 58 Stat. 231, 231-32. The Code
did, however, place a cap on the maximum marginal rate: a ceiling on total tax liability
prevented the effective tax rate from exceeding 90% of net income. Id. § 4(b), 58 Stat. 231,
232 (codified at I.R.C. § 12 (g)).
21 Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 11 (a), 78 Stat. 19, 22-23.
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Act changes, the individual income tax rates continued to range from
14% to 70%. The federal individual income tax produced $251.5 billion
in revenue, accounting for 10.4% of GNP and 54.6% of federal government revenue. 22 These percentages of revenue and GNP resemble the
1945 levels. 23 The corporate income tax, in contrast, had managed to

shed more of the World War II tax effects. By 1979, corporate income
tax revenues represented only 3.0% of the GNP and 15.5% of govern25
ment revenue, 24 down sharply from 1945 levels.

Over the forty years from 1939 to 1979, individual income taxes
became an essential component of federal revenues. As federal government activities expanded, revenues from individual income taxes moved
from 1.1% to over 10% of the GNP. Over the same period, marginal
rates rose sharply to 1945 levels, and receded very little from that peak.
B.

The Personal Exemption and the Zero Bracket Amount: The
"Gatekeepers" of the Code

World War II also brought basic individual income tax changes
other than marginal rate increases. Congress extended the income tax
to a large number of previously untaxed households. The magnitude of
this extension is striking. In 1939, approximately 6% of the total population filed individual tax returns, slightly more than half of which reported any tax owing.2 6 By 1945, the proportion of returns filed had
increased to over 35%, of which over five-sixths were taxable returns. 2 7
When the number of households covered by returns is considered, the
coverage of the tax system was extended from about 5% to 74% of the
22

The 1979 GNP was $2,413.9 billion. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL

ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981, at 420, table 699 [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL

ABSTRACT 1981]. Federal government tax revenues were $460.4 billion. d. at 256, table 434.
23

Cf. supra text accompanying note 15 (individual income tax in 1945 accounted for

9.0% of GNP and 43.4% of revenues). The 1979 ratio of individual income tax to GNP was
116% of the corresponding 1945 ratio; the 1979 ratio of individual income tax to total revenues was 126% of the 1945 ratio.
24 In 1979, the corporate income tax generated $71.4 billion. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
1981, supra note 22, at 256, table 434.
25

Cf. supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (corporate tax in 1945 accounted for

7.6% of GNP and 36.5% of revenues). The 1979 ratio of corporate income tax to GNP was
39.5% of the corresponding 1945 ratio; the 1979 ratio of corporate income tax to total revenues was 42.5% of the 1945 ratio. Reduction in the relative level of the corporate tax owes

more to deductions and credits such as the investment tax credit than to general rate reduction. These favorable provisions may discriminate against some sectors of the economy and

benefit larger corporations. See A. FELD, TAx POLICY AND CORPORATE CONCENTRATION
23-54 (1982).
26 In 1939, the total population of the United States was 131 million, yet only 7.7 million individual income tax returns were filed; 4.0 million returns reported some tax liability
and 3.7 million were nontaxable. HISTORICAL STATISTICS 1970 PART I,.supra note 13, ser. A
6-8, at 8; HISTORICAL STATISTICS 1970 PART 2, ser. Y 393-411, at 1110.

27 The 1945 population was 140 million; 50 million individual income tax returns were
filed, of which 42.7 million reported liability. Id
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28

population.
The Code contains two principal gatekeepers, the personal exemption and the zero bracket amount (ZBA), which determine the base income level from which the government begins to tax. Changes in either
of these structural components will expand or contract the number of
individuals drawn in as taxpayers. The personal exemption and ZBA,
however, are not limited in impact to low income taxpayers. Changes in
these components affect the tax rate and after-tax income of every
29
taxpayer.
1. Historical Changes in the PersonalExemption
The 1939 to 1945 increase in the coverage of the individual income
tax flowed principally from reduction of the personal exemption. The
deductible amount for a single individual in 1939 was $1,000. For a
married couple, the 1939 personal exemption was $2,500.30 Each
dependent gave rise to an additional $400 deduction. 3 ' Because the
median household income in 1939 was $1,231 a year, only a small percentage of the population had incomes large enough to be subject to
tax. 32

The high level of the personal exemption meant that the income
tax reached only discretionary household income: for each household
the tax base excluded a significant amount of income available to cover
subsistence at a modestly acceptable level of comfort.3 3 The tax fell on
relatively few families and when it did apply, it extended only to family
income in excess of that part which covered food, clothing, and shelter
34
needs.
By 1945, however, both the level and the value of the personal ex28
29

See L. SELTZER, THE PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS IN THE INCOME TAX 62 (1968).

See infra Section IIB.
I.R.C. § 25(b)(1) (1939).
Id § 25(b)(2).
32 The 1939 figure represents median money wage or salary income of primary families
and unrelated individuals. HISTORICAL STATISTICS 1970 PART 1, supra note 13, ser. G 353371, at 303. The analogous 1979 statistic-family and nonfamily households' total wage or
30
31

salary income-is $16,637. U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SER. P-60 No. 129, MONEY INCOME OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE U.S.: 1979, at 152,

table 38 (1981). Note that money income in both 1939 and 1979 would exceed these figures
by the amount of investment income and other receipts. The percentage of families with
incomes under $2,500 (the married couple exemption) was 87.9% in 1939. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1943, at 390, table 428

(1944). When the additional $400 deduction for each child is considered, many more households are removed from the tax base.
33
As used in the text, discretionary income means a household's income less a fixed
amount to cover subsistence; subsistence is treated as a uniform amount for all households
without variation for most individual circumstances.
34
Before World War II, the relatively small number of households covered by the personal income tax led to a fairly high level of public esteem for the tax laws. Thus in 1941
public opinion rallied behind efforts to finance the war and many people were dismayed by
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emption had declined sharply. War related changes reduced the exempted amount to $500 per person.3 5 Inflation further cut the buying
power of the shrunken allotment.
After World War II a relatively low exemption level became a permanent feature of the federal income tax. A 1947 Treasury study analyzed several different standards for the personal exemption as a "major
issue" in individual income tax policy.36 The study compared the level
of the personal exemption with three possible "subsistence" levels: a
maintenance budget, reflecting the minimum standard of living necessary to maintain health and efficiency of a manual worker; a somewhat
higher city workers' budget, based on actual urban costs; and a "health
and decency" budget, reflecting the cost of healthful and reasonably
comfortable living. 37 The study found that the 1947 personal exemption level of $500 fell below all three standards for single individuals or
married couples; families with dependents could meet the maintenance
budget, but not the others. In 1948, Congress increased the personal
exemption to $600, where it remained for many years. 38 Following this
small step, and for the past thirty-five years, the proper amount of the
personal exemption has stirred relatively little controversy.
Beginning in the late 1960s, tax policymakers linked exemption
levels with the poverty level, an income line used for some welfare classification purposes.3 9 The personal exemption plus the predecessors of the
zero bracket amount, discussed below, were intended to exempt income
below the poverty level from the income tax.40 This rationale emphasized the "gatekeeper" function of the personal exemption, preventing
congressional delay in satisfying the government's revenue needs. R. PAUL, TAXATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 303 (1954).
35 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 131(a), 56 Stat. 798, 827-28 (codified at I.R.C.

§ 25(b)(1)).
36

DIVISION OF TAx RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INDIVIDUAL INCOME

TAX EXEMPTIONS, INTRODUCTION (1947).
37 Id at 3-13.

38 Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 201, 62 Stat. 110, 112 (codified at I.R.C. § 25(b)(1)).
The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 801(a), 83 Stat. 487, 675, increased the

amount of the exemption to $625 for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969, and
before January 1, 1971. The Act also implemented a series of increases in the personal exemption, which reached its highest point of $750 for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1972. Id § 801(b)-(d), 83 Stat. 487, 675-76. The Revenue Act of 1978 raised the exemption to its current level of $1,000. See infia note 42 and accompanying text.
39 The official poverty level, itself a child of the 1960s, was determined by the money
income required to purchase three times the cost of the "economy food plan," based on a
Department of Agriculture finding that families of three or more spend a third of their income on food. (A slightly higher factor is applied for smaller households.) The number is
adjusted annually for inflation. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SER. P-60, No. 124, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1978, app. A, at 205.

40 H. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975); S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 53-55 (1971); H. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 204-08 (1969).
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taxation of those households so poor as to require public assistance. 4 1
The Revenue Act of 1978 increased the personal exemption to the
present level, $1,000.42 Although this amount doubled the 1945 figure,

the consumer price index had increased fourfold between 1945 and
1979. 43 In effect, the $1,000 exemption in 1979 was worth approximately $248 in 1945 dollars, almost one-half the 1945 exemption of
$500.
Proposals to increase the personal exemption to offset the effects of
inflation have received little attention. 44 A tax change that would reduce the liability of every taxpayer might be expected to have broad
appeal. Instead, the wide distribution of benefit would result in relatively modest gains for any single taxpayer while the revenue loss to the
Treasury would be significant. An increase of $100 in the personal exemption in 1983 would benefit a hypothetical family of four in the 30%
bracket (taxable income $29,000-$35,000) by $120 in 1983, whereas the
45
revenue loss would probably amount to $4.5 to 5 billion.
2.

The PersonalExemption as "Tar Subsidy"

Apart from its "gatekeeper" function, the personal exemption affects taxpayers in every income class.46 Unfortunately, a misperception
confusing the personal exemption with tax expenditures has contributed
to the neglect of the personal exemption. 4 7 A federal income tax benefit
cast as a deduction or exclusion provides a greater after-tax benefit to
41
The text omits any discussion of the general tax credit, a short-lived mechanism expressing some characteristics of the personal exemption in credit form. See I.R.C. § 42 (1976)
(expired Dec. 31, 1978).
42
Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 102(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2771 (codified at I.R.C. § 151).
43
Using the base 1967 = 100, the Consumer Price Index for 1945 was 53.9 and for 1979
was 217.4. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS 1970 PART 1, supra note 13, ser. E 135-166, at 210;
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1981, supra note 22, at 467. Here, as elsewhere in the article, comparisons of dollar amounts between years are adjusted for inflation based on changes in the
consumer price index. These adjustments are imperfect because they fail to reflect long-term
changes in the mix of goods and services people enjoy at different income levels, they ignore
changes in public sector provision of goods and services, and they allocate no part of productivity increases to changes in the adjusted amounts. The adjusted amounts therefore serve
only to make rough comparisons, particularly when made over many years.
44
For one proposal, see Tax Aspects of the President'sEconomic Program,Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Ways andMeans, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 913 (statement of Alan Feld),repointedas
The Casefor an Increase in the PersonalExemption, 12 TAX NOTES 1459 (1981). See also Schenk,
Simplifing Dependaen Exemptions." A Proposalfor Refonn, 35 TAX LAW. 855 (1982) (expressing
concern over practical application of personal exemption rules).
45 See H.R. REP. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 304 (1978).
46 See infra Section IIB. (discussing impact of changes in personal exemption on taxpayers in every income category).
47 As to the concept of tax expenditures, see generally S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX
REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973); Bittker, Accountingfor Federal "Tax
Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax
Expenditure Concept.: Current Developments and EmergingIssues, 20 B.C.L. REV. 225 (1979); Feld,
Book Review, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1047 (1975).
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higher income taxpayers than to others. 48 Such a deduction or exclusion operates as an "upside-down" subsidy. Not every tax provision
favorable to a class of taxpayers, however, constitutes a disguised subsidy. The income tax levies its progressive rates on a net income base
that reflects the taxpayer's ability to pay. The personal exemption appropriately takes the form of a deduction to modify an individual's tax
base and to exclude from taxation the income required for household
necessities. Any disparate benefit resulting from different marginal rates
reflects a proper application of the income tax, not a separate government expenditure through the tax system.
Moreover, the conclusion that the exemption functions as an "upside-down" subsidy is generally based on an evaluation of the deduction
or exemption in isolation from other characteristics reported in the taxpayer's return. As discussed in greater detail later, one measure of the
fairness of a tax change is the relative change in an individual's tax burden. Thus, in evaluating the fairness of a decrease in tax through a
change in the personal exemption, the dollar amount of tax benefit may
be larger for a taxpayer with greater income, but the relative change
may be far smaller.4 9 If the ratio of the change in tax to total tax liability declines with income, then tax reduction through a personal exemp'50
tion change should be characterized as "right side up."
A particular application of the tax expenditure argument posits
48
This result flows from the simple arithmetic of applying the graduated rate schedule
to a deduction. For example, a $100 deduction for a taxpayer with an 11% marginal rate
produces tax savings of $1 1; the same deduction for a taxpayer in a 50% bracket produces $50
in tax savings.
The Code contains scores of special tax provisions that confer subsidies through the remission of taxes. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-344, § 308, 88 Stat. 297, 313, requires separate budget reports of tax expenditures.
Occasionally a tax expenditure arises when Congress extends an appropriate structural element of the tax law to subsidize a designated group. Thus, unlike the basic personal exemption allowance, the extra exemptions allowed for children who are students age 19 or over, the
blind, and the elderly probably constitute tax expenditures rather than basic structural elements of the tax Code. The estimated revenue loss for 1983 for these three classes is $1.6
billion, $30 million, and $2.4 billion respectively. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, TAX EXPENDITURES, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, 1983, at 28-30, table G-1. Nevertheless, the income distribution of the benefits
for the blind and the elderly does not seem to skew significantly in favor of wealthy taxpayers.
In 1979, when 12.5% of all returns filed reported adjusted gross income of $30,000 or more,
9% of the extra personal exemptions for blindness and 10% of the extra personal exemptions
for the elderly went to taxpayers in this income class. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 1979, at 10, table 1.1; id at 45,
table 2.8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICS OF INCOME 1979].
49 See infra table following note 76 (Homestate Option 2.3 reflects this result).
50 Id Further, any variation in the net benefit per taxpayer by income class must be
considered along with the number of taxpayers in each class. In our current system, the vast
majority of taxpayers fall within low or middle level marginal-rate categories. For example,
in 1979, 83% of the personal exemptions claimed were in tax returns with less than $30,000
adjusted gross income. The returns in this category accounted for 87.5% of the individual
filings for that year. STATISTICS OF INCOME 1979, supra note 48, at 45, table 2.8.
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that tax relief targeted at the poorest members of society will not reach
them through changes in the personal exemption. The very poor generally file no tax returns and incur no tax liability. Any increase in the
personal exemption would have no effect on these people because their
tax liability cannot fall below zero. This argument is not persuasive
against a properly shaped personal exemption; it merely demonstrates
the limitations inherent in any adjustment in taxable income, such as a
deduction or exclusion, as a way to relieve poverty. Direct-aid programs
may be better instruments for relief of the poor than changes in the
income tax. Of the weapons in the tax arsenal, only a credit against tax,
refundable when greater than the tax liability, can serve this function.
No exclusion or deduction would have the effect of reaching this excluded class. For everyone else, however, especially low and moderate
income taxpayers, the failure of adjustments in tax liability to reach
nontaxpayers is irrelevant in choosing between increases in the personal
exemption and other provisions for adjusting taxable income or rates. 5 1
Congress has failed to increase the personal exemption to correspond with inflationary cuts in the value of the dollar. Neglect of the
personal exemption stems in part from misperceptions of the exemption
as a subsidy that grants its greatest benefit to wealthy taxpayers. At a
proper level, the personal exemption could serve as an exclusion of the
income necessary for subsistence living, leaving only discretionary income available for taxation. In its current form, the personal exemption
fails to accomplish this goal.
3.

The StandardDeduction-Zero Bracket Amount

The zero bracket amount supplements the function of the personal
exemption. The ZBA sets an additional threshold level for filing an individual tax return, and thereby excludes as taxpayers a further set of
low-income earners. In addition, the ZBA tries to provide an easily administered substitute for itemized deductions.
The large increase in tax return filers anticipated as a result of the
51
A more traditional concern with the personal exemption is whether it should be the
same for all individuals or vary with family circumstances. See Surrey, Federal Taxation of the
Fami--7he Revenue Act of 19M6, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1097, 1099-1100 (1948). The argument
for a variable personal exemption contends that the cost of providing support for a single
person exceeds the incremental cost of providing for a dependent; a single taxpayer thus
should receive a larger deduction. Such was the case in 1939, when single taxpayers received
a $1,000 personal exemption, and taxpayers with dependent children received only $400 per
child. (On the other hand, the $2,500 exemption for a married couple may appear somewhat
anomalous.) See supra notes 30-31. However, given the current inadequacy of the personal.
exemption, see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text, it makes little sense to differentiate
among classes of taxpayers. Moreover, the ZBA to some degree does make distinctions based
on family status. The ZBA for a married couple, $3,400, lies about midway between the ZBA
for a single person, $2,300, and the ZBA for two single persons, $4,600. Also, dependents with
unearned income may not claim the ZBA. I.R.C. § 63(e) (Supp. V 1981).
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World War II reduction of the personal exemption pressed the Treasury
to simplify tax return filing.52 Most of the new taxpayers had never

filled out an income tax return. The standard deduction allowed simplified reporting by authorizing a deduction of 10%, up to $500, in lieu of
itemized nonbusiness deductions. 53 Using the standard deduction, a
taxpayer computed his tax from a table of income and dependency
levels, so that a taxpayer whose only income consisted of compensation
could file a return with minimal computation. For most taxpayers the
standard deduction obviated the need to keep track of personal expendi52 In the House Report on the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, which set the pattern
for the standard deduction, the Committee stated:
The bill is confined to the simplification of the individual income tax. In the
preparation of this legislation your committee had in mind the following
objectives:
1. To relieve the great majority of taxpayers from the necessity of computing their income tax.
2. To reduce the number of tax computations.
3. To simplify the return form.
H. REP. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1944).
Another World War II innovation had great significance for the income tax but does not
bear directly on the subject of this article. The influx of new taxpayers in 1942 foreshadowed
a potentially enormous administrative problem. The income tax had operated largely on
voluntary reporting based on self-assessment, with lump sum or quarterly payments. Audits
of returns provided some after-the-fact review. The large group of taxpayers entering the
system would have to file tax forms for the first time. Some invariably would neglect to do so.
The audit staff would be swamped, making enforcement of the tax much more problematic.
New taxpayers might dissipate their income before they paid the tax levied on it. To meet
these concerns the Treasury initially proposed a system for withholding taxes on wages, dividends, and bond interest at the source. After the House passed a bill embodying these proposals, the Treasury dropped the withholding of interest for administrative reasons. As
finally enacted, withholding applied only to salaries and wages. H. REP. No. 2333, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1942) (statement by Mr. Doughton).
The fact that machinery already existed for the collection at the source of social security
taxes on compensation income may have influenced Congress to apply withholding for income taxes only to compensation, thereby avoiding the administrative problems arguably
presented by an entirely new withholding system for dividends and interest. See S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d. Sess., 165, 167 (1942), reprintedin 1942-2 C.B. 504, 626, 627. The withholding provisions as originally enacted in 1942 applied first to the victory tax, then to the
normal tax and surtax. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 172(a), 56 Stat. 798, 888-91 (codified
at I.R.C. § 466).
Withholding of taxes on salaries and wages has become an integral part of the income
tax system. Income tax compliance is highest for income in the form of salaries and wages,
falling off dramatically for other forms of income. In effect, then, when the enforcement
machinery of the income tax is taken into account, the tax bears more heavily on salary and
wages than on other forms of income. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
added provisions for withholding on interest and dividend income, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 301,
96 Stat. 324, 576-84, but Congress repealed them in 1983 before they went into effect. See
The Interest and Dividend Compliance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67 (Aug. 5, 1983).
53 Congress introduced the standard deduction in the Revenue Act of 1941, ch. 412,
§ 102(a), 55 Stat. 687, 689-91 (codified at I.R.C. § 400). Originally called "Optional Tax on
Individuals with Certain Gross Income of $3,000 or Less," the section permitted taxpayers to
file a simplified return with a 10% reduction of tax. Id. The Individual Income Tax Act of
1944, ch. 210, § 9(a), 58 Stat. 231, 236-37 (codified at I.R.C. § 23aa), allowed taxpayers a
deduction of 10% from adjusted gross income up to $500.
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For the government, it mini-

mized the audit resources needed to police the deductions of millions of
taxpayers reporting modest amounts. The result was surprisingly workable considering the magnitude of the increase in the number of
taxpayers.
For almost two decades after World War II, the standard deduction
remained at 10% of adjusted gross income, although the ceiling was
raised to $1,000 in 1948. 5 5 The Revenue Act of 1964 introduced the

minimum standard deduction, to enhance the amount deductible by
low-income filers.5 6 The minimum standard deduction took into account the number of dependents, as well as the income of the taxpayer.
This alternative standard deduction evolved through several formulations. In 1977 the standard deduction became a fixed dollar amount
dependent on the filing status of the taxpayer, was renamed the zero
57
bracket amount, and was built directly into the tax tables.
The Code currently sets the threshold for filing a tax return for
most single individuals at $3,300, the sum of the personal exemption
($1,000) and the ZBA ($2,300). 58 For an individual above the threshold,
the ZBA provides the benefit of a variable deduction that declines with
itemized deductions the taxpayer otherwise would claim.5 9 The ZBA
adds a full $2,300 deduction for a single individual with no itemized
deductions. The added amount declines dollar-for-dollar as the taxpayer's itemized deductions increase and, at $2,300 of itemized deductions, the ZBA becomes valueless to the taxpayer.
This sliding value implies two different effects. First, the amount of
a taxpayer's itemized deductions tends to increase with income,6 0 and
the ZBA benefits therefore tend to disappear as income rises. The ZBA
provides little or no benefit to high income itemizers, and primarily benefits low to moderate income taxpayers. The ZBA benefits are thus inversely proportional with the income of the taxpayer. Second, certain
itemized deductions, such as interest and property taxes, provide a tax
preference for personal consumption. To the extent that the ZBA
54 Taxpayers near the margin, on the other hand, computed their taxes both ways to
determine the more favorable method. Some taxpayers sought to alternate standard-deduction with itemized-deduction filing years and to group deductions in the latter.
55 See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 302(a), 62 Stat. 110, 114-15.
56 See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 112(a), 78 Stat. 19, 23 (codified at
I.R.C. § 141 (1976) (repealed 1977)).
57 See Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 102(a), 91
Stat. 126, 135-37 (codified at I.R.C. § 63 (Supp. V 1981)).
58 See I.R.C. § 6012(a) (Supp. V 1981). In certain cases where an individual may not
claim the full benefit of the ZBA (e.g., a nonresident alien) the filing threshold reverts to
$1,000. Id § 6012(a)(1)(G)(i)-(iv).
59 See id § 63.
60 Some itemized deductions derive from home ownership, which also correlates with
income. Cf. R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx 117 (rev. ed. 1976).
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blunts these incentives, it moves the tax system toward encouragement
of savings rather than consumption. The very nature of the ZBA, however, imposes an important limitation on its usefulness in the tax structure. To take advantage of the ZBA the individual taxpayer in effect
waives itemized deductions up to $2,300. Medical expenses, state income taxes, and casualty losses may constitute involuntary applications
of income that reduce ability to pay, but the ZBA taxpayer nonetheless
will be unable to claim these deductions. 61 As the amount of these involuntary yet nondeductible payments increases, the ZBA distorts the
process of identifying discretionary income as the base for taxation. 62
In short, the ZBA unsuccessfully tries to do double duty. It does
serve many taxpayers as an easily administered substitute for itemized
deductions. It cannot, however, simultaneously supplement the personal exemption in defining the appropriate tax-exempt subsistence
63
level for income tax purposes.
61 See Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Ta, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113 (1974); see also Feld, Abortion to Aging: Problems of Definition in the Medical Expense Ta
Deduction, 58 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1978).
62 For example, a single taxpayer with $5,000 in interest income normally would pay
taxes on $1,700, with the ZBA and personal exemption offsetting the remainder. Suppose the
individual has no tax-exempt income and does not own a home. Such a taxpayer would be
likely to have considerably less than $2,300 in itemized deductions. One would expect that
most of his income goes to pay for food and shelter. If the taxpayer were to incur a medical
expense of $2,000, it would reduce his ability to purchase food and shelter. However, because
the ZBA already covers that deduction, the taxpayer's loss of discretionary income will not be
reflected in a reduction of the amount subject to tax.
63
Three tax matters unrelated to the World War II period complete the background for
the 1981 Act changes: FICA taxes, the earned income credit, and the credit for the elderly.
It is conventional to consider FICA taxes, I.R.C. § 3101 (Supp. V 1981), separately from
income taxes because of the historic link between the former and social security benefits.
Over the past two decades, however, that link has weakened as the magnitude of the FICA
tax burden has increased. For most wage earners, the federal income tax and the FICA tax
apply to virtually the same base; for many the latter imposes the greater burden. An individual with $5,500 income in 1981 incurred income tax of $314 and social security tax of
$365.75. The individual's employer paid a matching amount in social security taxes. FICA
tax revenues for 1979 amounted to $112.8 billion, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1981, supra note
22, at 256, table 434.
The earned income credit (EIC), I.R.C. § 43 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and the credit for
the elderly, id § 37, arguably supplement the operation of the personal exemption and the
ZBA with regard to low income entrants into the tax system. Wage earners and others who
earn services income, if eligible, may claim the EIC. Eligibility is determined by the taxpayer's family status: the taxpayer must have at least one child and either be married, a head
of household, or a widow or widower. Id § 43(c) (Supp. V 1981). The credit, which was
introduced by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204(a), 89 Stat. 26,30-31,
reduces tax liability by 10% of earned income up to a maximum credit of $500. The credit
then phases out for adjusted gross income over $6,000 on a ratio of I to 8 (credit : adjusted
gross income), I.R.C. § 43(b) (Supp. V 1981), so that the credit disappears at $10,000. Because the credit is refundable, it operates as a negative income tax for a taxpayer who meets
the earned income and family qualifications. The benefit, however, is largely offset by the
individual's social security taxes.
Historically, retired persons did not include social security benefits in income. I.R.C.
§ 86, added by the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-2 1, § 121(a), 97 Stat.
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II
MODELS TO HELP ANALYZE RATE CHANGES

In comparing different rate schedules, it is important to distinguish
between a general increase or decrease in the tax burden and changes in
its distribution. A general tax increase or reduction presumably can
hold constant the relative distribution of the tax burden. On the other
hand, taxpayers at different income levels may not share equally the
burden or benefits of a rate change. A comparison of the relative distributions necessarily precedes a judgment concerning the fairness of the
changes.
Unfortunately, no single standard for evaluating changes in the distribution of the tax burden enjoys wide acceptance.6 4 Relative changes
in marginal tax rates and effective tax rates provide useful information
concerning the change in the tax burden on each new dollar of income,
and the tax burden on total income, respectively. Often, a more meaningful criterion is after-tax income and the change in the taxpayer's net
ability to purchase goods and services. An important refinement of this
criterion excludes the portion of income that a taxpayer must commit to
maintain a subsistence level of existence; this measure looks to discretionary income as the appropriate measure of change. 65 Of all the measures, the last probably best captures the common understanding of the
income tax and would seem best suited for evaluating income tax
66
changes.
A simplified model will help to analyze fairness in income tax rate
changes. Because the personal exemption bears directly on the relative
burdens imposed by rate changes, it will be incorporated into the
67
model.
65, 80-84, taxes up to one-half of social security benefits in some cases, based on other income.
Section 37 of the Code, the credit for the elderly, partly equalizes the tax burden on those
who have provided for their own retirement income by allowing a 15% credit based on an
"initial amount," $2,500 in the case of a single individual. I.R.C. § 37(b) (1976). This initial
amount is reduced dollar for dollar by social security benefits received and further reduced on
a 1 to 2 ratio by adjusted gross income over $7,500. Id § 37(c).
As these brief descriptions suggest, the earned income credit and the credit for the elderly
address particular problems for certain low income persons. They do not bridge the gap
between the more general provisions for the personal exemption and the ZBA and subsistence
levels.
64
esgenerally R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIc FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACirice (2d ed. 1966); Jakobsson, On the Measurement ofthe Degree of .ogression, 5 J. PUB. ECON.
161 (1976); Musgrave & Thin, Income Tax Progression 1929-48, 56 J. POL. EON. 498 (1948).
65 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
66 See infla Section 1IB3.
67 Se supra notes 26-51 and accompanying text. For simplicity in the remainder of the
article, the model ignores itemized deductions and therefore treats the personal exemption
and ZBA as a unitary concept.
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A.

Marginal and Effective Rate Comparisons

Suppose the country of Homestate in Year 1 imposed a tax of 10%
on the first $25,000 of net income and 25% on the balance. A, B, and C,
who earned net income of $5,000, $20,000, and $50,000 respectively, incurred tax of $500, $2,000, and $8,750. The total tax revenue, $11,250,
represented 15% of total Homestate net income. Assume further that
Homestate's population generally approved the relative distribution of
these tax payments. The figures are summarized below:
HOMESTATE TAX-YEAR

Net
Income
A
$ 5,000
B
20,000
C
50,000
Total .$75,000

Tax
$ 500
2,000
8,750
$11,250

I

Effective
Rate of Tax
10.0%
10.0
17.5
15

Marginal
Tax Rate
10%
10
25

In year II, Homestate goes to war and wishes to treble its revenues.
The country has available several ways to increase its revenues, with
varying impact on taxpayers A, B, and C 68
1. IncreasingMarginalRates-Option 2. 1
Homestate could achieve the desired revenue increase simply by
trebling its marginal rates, to 30% and 75%. Under this option, both the
marginal rates (the rates of tax on the next dollar of income) and the
effective rates (the tax paid divided by net income) would bear the same
bracket-to-bracket ratio between A, B, and C as they did in year 1.69
HOMESTATE

TAX-YEAR II-OPTION 2.1

Net
Effective
Marginal
Income
Tax
Rate of Tax
Tax Rate
A
$ 5,000
$ 1,500
-30 %
30%
B
20,000
6,000
30
30
C
50,000
26,250
52.5
75
Total $75,000
$33,750
45
C, however, might object to this solution. Although C still pays
taxes at the same ratio with respect to A and B as he did in Year I (250%
68

For analytic purposes, the text ignores the spending side of the governmental activity,

treating the goods and services the government purchased with the added revenue as not
enhancing the ability of individuals in Homestate to purchase additional goods and services.
69 Each taxpayer would also continue to pay the same proportion of Homestate's total
tax revenue: A would pay 4.4%, B 17.8%, and C 77.8%.
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greater marginal rate, and 175% of their effective rate) he now forfeits a
far more substantial amount of his net income to Homestate.
2.

Altering Step Points and Increasing Rates-Option 2.2

As an alternative which would mollify C, Homestate could reduce
the point at which the higher marginal rate begins (referred to as the
step point). Homestate then could generate the desired revenue increase
without trebling the marginal rate in the highest bracket. For example,
suppose Homestate imposes a tax of 30% on the first $10,000 (a decrease
of $15,000 in the step point) and 52.5% on the balance (an increase of
2.1 times the 25% rate). This schedule also trebles Homestate's revenues
in comparison to year J.70
HOMESTATE TAX-YEAR I--OPTION 2.2

A
B
C
Total

Net
Income

Tax

Effective
Rate of Tax

Marginal
Tax Rate

$ 5,000
20,000
50,000
$75,000

$ 1,500
8,250
24,000
$33,750

30 %
41.25
48
45

30 %
52.5
52.5

A's situation remains the same under either option. C"s position improves under Option 2.2, at B's expense.
3.

Analyzig the Two Alternatives

Homestate's choice between these alternatives depends upon the
criterion and the point of view it applies. From the point of view of
taxpayer self-interest, B would favor the former option (Option 2.1),
whereas C would favor the latter (Option 2.2). As long as the step point
remains above $5,000, the change does not directly engage A's self71
interest.
Homestate also may have a view as to the relative fairness of each
option. The country's assessment might proceed from first principles as
to the proper role of a tax system, the nature of its base, and the appropriateness of a graduated rate structure as compared to a proportional
one. 72 More likely, Homestate will not treat the Year II tax as a clean
slate, but will seek to relate the options to the relatively satisfactory Year
70 Under both Options 2.1 and 2.2, Homestate's revenues would rise from $11,250 to
$33,750.
71 A might have a preference for Option 2.1 if he expects his income to rise above
$10,000, but not as high as Cs income.
72

See general

W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGREsSIVE TAXA-

TION (1953); N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAxATION:

THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY

VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1947).

(1938); W.
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I experience. Option 2.1 appears to make that connection more directly
than Option 2.2. The logical connection to the Year I experience runs
as follows: if Homestate considered the Year I rates fair, some multiple
of those rates should probably be fair as well. This logic reaches a limit,
however, if the rates become very high, because most people would reject rates over, at, or near 100% on fairness grounds. 73 At lower rate
levels, however, an equal percentage change in the tax rates, which
maintains the same relationship of tax burdens as in Year I, might be
considered fair.
On the other hand, marginal rates better indicate the effect of income taxes on society's productivity. High marginal tax rates probably
exert considerable influence on economically productive decisionmaking.74 C's 75% marginal rate under Option 2.1 may be so high as to
cause concern about tax influences in decisionmaking. Option 2.2
reduces C's marginal rate to 52.5%, but at the cost of increasing B's
marginal rate to that same level. Without empirical data, 75 it is hard to
know which alternative provides less total tax oriented change in
decisionmaking.
Each of Homestate's alternatives for raising tax rates and revenues
derives some support from fairness principles. Productivity concerns
play a further role in defining the most desirable alternative. The relative burden that a rate change imposes on different taxpayers, however,
is only one consideration. Homestate also must consider the income
each taxpayer is left with after the tax. Option 2.1 reduces A's after-tax
income from $4,500 to $3,500 and B's after-tax income from $18,000 to
$14,000, a decline in each case of 22%. C's after-tax income suffers a
heavier decline of 42%, from $41,250 to $23,750. Option 2.2 results in
the same 22% reduction for A and almost equalizes the decline in aftertax income for B and C B's after-tax income drops from $18,000 in
Year I to $11,750 in Year II, a decline of 34.7%, whereas C's goes from
73 Some, however, may advocate rates at these levels on grounds of income
redistribution.
74 The marginal-rate criterion focuses on the individual's next dollar of income and how
much benefit he will derive from that dollar after taxes. Two large classes of decisions often
described as affected by high marginal tax rates are savings-consumption decisions and workleisure decisions. An individual may save less and consume more currently or may shift time
from work to leisure if taxes reduce the net return on saving or working to a low enough level.
One underlying premise is that society as a whole would be better off if people would make
the same decisions they would make in a tax-free world, a premise often inconsistent with
efforts to use the tax system to shape decisionmaking through incentives.
A related assumption often implied by the assertion that society as a whole is better off
with such decisionmaking is that all individuals will also be better off. It is possible, of course,
that the added productivity will benefit some, but not others. In addition, the productivity
based world view does not account for the possibility of explicit wealth redistribution goals
within society. Finally, focusing on the tax code as an incentive or disincentive device ignores
the effect that other institutions play in decisionmaking based on productivity.
75 Congress often makes tax decisions without the benefit of empirical data.
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$41,250 in Year I to $26,000 in Year II, a decline of 37.0%. By the
standard of proportionality in reduced after-tax income as compared to
Year I, both options may be unfair to higher income taxpayers; Option
2.2, however, distributes the decline in after-tax income more evenly.
B.

Refining the Model: After-Tax and Discretionary Income
Evaluations

The range of Homestate's Year II options broadens significantly if
the simplified model takes into account the effects of a personal exemption. Assume that the Year I model had incorporated a $5,000 personal
exemption into the income calculations for A, B, and C A, B, and C
thus had respective net incomes prior to the exemption of $10,000,
$25,000, and $55,000. Assume further that the Homestate tax system
also includes X and Y, whose net incomes in Year I were $3,000 and
$5,000. In Year I both X and Y were free of any tax liability because
the $5,000 personal exemption excluded 100% of their incomes from the
tax.
1. Reducing the Amount of the PersonalExemption-Option 23
With the inclusion of a personal exemption in the model, Homestate can now increase revenues in Year II by reducing the personal
exemption. If, for example, it cuts the personal exemption from $5,000
to $2,000, X and Y will become taxpayers. Two new taxpayers will now
share in the tax burden, and more of the total income of A, B, and C
falls within the taxable range. As a result, Homestate does not need to
raise marginal rates as much as under either Option 2.1 or Option 2.2.
Rates of 25% on the first $10,000 and 46% on the balance will suffice to
achieve required revenues.
HOMESTATE TAX-YEAR II-OPTION 2.376

Effective Rate of
Tax
Taxable
Net
Income
Income
25.0%
8.3%
25.0
15.0
25.0
20.0
36.9
33.9

X
Y
A
B

Net
Income
$ 3,000
5,000
10,000
25,000

Taxable
Income
$ 1,000
3,000
8,000
23,000

Tax
$ 250
750
2,000
8,480

C

55000

53,000

22,280

42.0

40.5

$98,000

$88,000

$33,760

38.4

34.4

Total

Marginal
Tax Rate
25%
25
25
46
46

76 Because of recognition of the personal exemption, the term "net income" no longer
captures the base to which the tax applies. For this reason, a distinction is made in the table
between taxable income (the tax base after the personal exemption) and net income (earnings
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The criteria introduced earlier can help to compare Option 2.3
with the other Year II options. Viewed from the perspective of selfinterest, Option 2.3 benefits C and raises everyone else's taxes.
Under the marginal-rate criterion, the reduction in the personal exemption embodied in Option 2.3 allows lower marginal rates for A, B,
and C than under the first two options. In addition, Y,whose next dollar would have been subject to tax at 30% under the first two options,
also enjoys a decline in marginal tax rate. If high marginal rates for
these taxpayers affect decisionmaking and productivity, Option 2.3's
lower marginal rates may produce less change in taxpayer behavior (as
compared with decisionmaking in a tax-free environment) than the
other two options.
Only X suffers an increase in marginal rate, from 0 to 25%. Of all
the taxpayers, X probably has the smallest amount of discretionary income and therefore less control than any other taxpayer over decisions
that may be influenced by tax rates. X's reaction to tax changes is
therefore less important to Homestate's productivity than any other tax77
payer's reaction.
A comparison of the change in effective tax rates between Year I
and Option 2.3 reveals that two taxpayers, X and Y, move from paying
no tax to incurring tax liability. In addition, although the aggregate
effective tax rate goes up 2.9 times, from 11.5% of net income to 34.4%,
two taxpayers, A and B, suffer tax-burden increases by more than the
average, of 4 and 4.25 times, respectively. The gain to both from lower
marginal rates is therefore more than offset by subjecting a larger portion of their income to tax. In contrast, C's income tax burden goes up
only 2.5 times. 78 By this criterion, C benefits disproportionately from
Option 2.3.
2.

Comparison of After- Tax Income

Marginal and effective rates reflect the tax burden on each addiminus the expenses needed to generate earnings). Applied to taxable income, the effectiverate criterion leaves an incomplete picture. The following table reflects the effective-rate
comparison for the three Year II Options based on net income.
Year I Option 2.1
Option 2.2
Option 2.3
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
8.3%
0.0
0.0
0.0
15.0
5.0
15.0
15.0
20.0
8.0
24.0
33.0
34.0
15.9
47.7
43.6
40.5
Total
11.5
34.4
34.4
34.4
77 Pushing the logic to its natural conclusion suggests that an income tax structure that
seeks to maximize productivity will embody a declining marginal rate. Taxpayers with
higher income and greater choice thus would not suffer tax-induced change in decisionmaking. This result runs counter to the imposition of higher taxes on those taxpayers who enjoy
X
1'
A
B
C

high incomes.
78 See table, supra note 76.
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tional dollar of income and the total tax burden on the taxpayer's net
income, respectively. An evaluation of after-tax income focuses on the
amount of money that remains for each taxpayer to spend. A comparison of the change in after-tax income between Year I and each of the
three Year II options suggests a remarkably different allocation of burdens. Under all three options, after-tax income declines by larger percentages as income increases. This criterion therefore suggests that all
three options impose too much of the tax burden on the higher income
taxpayers. Option 2.3, however, which lowers the level of the personal
exemption to draw X' and Y into the tax system, evidences the least
disparate treatment of the five taxpayers.
DECLINE IN AFTER-TAx NET INCOME FROM YEAR I TO YEAR II

Option 2.1
0.0%
0.0
10.5
17.4
37.8

X"

Y

A
B
C

Option 2.2
0.0%
0.0
10.5
27.2
33.0

Option 2.3
8.3%
15.0
15.8
28.2
29.3

As expected, X and Y suffer a greater decline in after-tax income
under Option 2.3 than under the other two options, and C is better off.
Perhaps more surprisingly, A is significantly worse off under Option 2.3.
B is better off under Option 2.1, but is treated much the same by Options 2.2 and 2.3. Unlike Options 2.1 and 2.2, Option 2.3 does impose
roughly equivalent levels of sacrifice on B and C, but still imposes a
substantially greater relative burden on them in moving from Year I to
Year II than on the other taxpayers. Y and A are similarly grouped at a
percentage of reduction in after-tax income that puts them close to each
other and at about half the percentage of B and C
3.

Comparison ofD'scretionay Income

If net income is taken as the proper measure of tax paying capacity,
the comparison of after-tax income provides a satisfactory measure of
the changes in personal welfare that Homestate's new tax rates cause.
Net income, however, does not adequately measure an individual's ability to pay taxes. Taxpayers need to provide a minimum standard of
goods and services for themselves in order to survive in society. 79 Some
might urge that discretionary income (net income minus the amount
needed to live at a subsistence level) is the only income realistically
available for paying taxes. More generally, however, the concepts of
subsistence level and discretionary income are normative concepts, the
79

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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content of which depends upon social norms and values as well as on
physical minima for food, clothing, shelter, and the like.
By including a personal exemption amount in its tax schedule,
Homestate implicitly may have opted for discretionary income as the
proper base for its income tax. Assuming that the personal exemption
amount of $5,000 in Year I was an accurate measure of the subsistence
income level for an individual taxpayer, 0 X and Y had no discretionary
income in Year I and properly escaped taxation.
A comparison of after-tax discretionary income under each of the
three Year II options yields results very different from those under the
other three criteria. The relative burdens under Option 2.3 are especially revealing.8 '
DECLINE IN DISCRETIONARY INCOME FROM YEAR

I TO YEAR II

Option 2.1
Option 2.2
Option 2.3
X
0.0%
0.0%
Negative
Y
0.0
0.0
Negative
.4
22.2
22.2
33.3%
B
22.2
34.7
36.0
C
42.4
37.0
32.8
Under Option 2.3, B suffers a slightly heavier loss of discretionary income than A or C, but the variation is relatively small. Option 2.3
treats A, B, and C with relative equality, but at the cost of taxing X's
and Y's nondiscretionary income and driving down their after-tax incomes below subsistence levels. A determination of the relative fairness
of Option 2.3 depends upon the importance of this cost. If it is important to avoid imposing a tax on X and Y', then Option 2.2 may be
82
preferable.
The three options for Year II reveal the tradeoffs that Homestate
must consider in obtaining its desired revenue increase. Option 2.1
80 X, whose income in Year I fell below the presumed subsistence level, either lived
below the subsistence level, or had to support himself by withdrawing savings, borrowing
money, or depending on private or public funds.
81 The discretionary-income criterion substantially reduces what appeared to be disparate treatment of the five taxpayers. Viewed from this criterion, taxpayers on different levels
of a progressive rate schedule are being treated more fairly than the other three criteria would
imply. The following table charts the change in after-tax discretionary income from Year I
imposed by Option 2.3.

Year 1
X
Y

S-

Year 2

Change ($)

2,000
$- 2,250
0
750
A
4,500
3,000
B
18,000
11,520
C
41,250
27,720
82 Indeed, Option 2.2, by altering the step points
relative sacrifices of B and C closer to A's sacrifice.

Change (%)

250
Negative
750
Negative
1,500
33.3
6,480
36.0
13,530
32.8
further, can be fine tuned to bring the
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(across the board marginal-rate increases) maintains the same proportional differences among taxpayers, but threatens productivity and decisionmaking by requiring a very high marginal tax rate on upper income
taxpayers. Option 2.2 (altering the step points) mitigates the high marginal-rate impact of the first option, but forces middle income taxpayers
(such as B) to bear a greater share of the overall tax burden. Option 2.3
(lowering the personal exemption amount) further reduces the marginal-rate impact, but at the expense of placing a higher tax burden on
low-income taxpayers (X', Y, and A) than the previous alternatives.
III
THE 1981 ACT

The individual tax cuts in the 1981 Act presented a unique opportunity. The decision to reduce individual income taxes by a large
sum-over $100 billion in 1984 when the provisions are fully phased
in-was unprecedented in modern times. The forms that decision could
take vary greatly. To some extent, of course, arguments about the form
of a tax cut reflect self-interest covered with a rhetorical patina.8 3 Yet
whatever self-interest in fact entered the legislative calculus, it was not
chiefly a majoritarian bias: an equal per-capita share of $100 billion
would be $435 annually for every man, woman, and child,8 4 which is
significantly more than most individuals will realize from the 1981 Act.
The 1981 Act allocated the great bulk of the tax cut to rate reduction. Most of the balance of the individual income tax reduction went
to mitigate the "marriage tax penalty" by creation of a new deduction
for two-earner couples. 85 Two themes dominated -legislative consideration of the individual tax-rate cuts: the need to counter the effects of
inflation and the need to increase productivity. 86 A complete evaluation
of the competing economic considerations surrounding the productivity
theme is beyond the scope of this article.8 7 The balance of this article
examines the fairness of the rate cuts in light of the criteria previously
developed, along with the effects of inflation.
83

See generally L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961).

84 Based on an estimated U.S. population of 230 million.
85 I.R.C. § 221 (Supp. V 1981).
86 See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.
87 Productivity induced rate cuts focus on two separate decisions: the amount of the
rate reduction and the proper distribution. Both decisions rest in part on economic assumptions concerning the appropriate level of investment and the proper tradeoff between savings
and consumption. See supra note 74. Both decisions also implicate economic and political
assumptions regarding the proper division of economic decisionmaking between the government and private individuals. Finally, social-equality concerns often require a marginal
tradeoff with productivity considerations. Seegenerallv A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY:
THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
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A. The Effect of Inflation on the Fairness Models
A return to the Homestate model will be helpful in evaluating the
effects of inflation on the four fairness criteria.
1. Failure to Adjust for Infltion-Option 3.1
Assume that Homestate has adopted Option 2.3 for Year II, consisting of a personal exemption of $2,000 and rates of 25% on the first
$10,000 of taxable income and 46% on the balance. Assume further that
inflation runs at a rate of 100% in the next year and that each person's
nominal income will double in Year III. Taxes aside, everyone remains
in the same economic position. With no adjustment of the tax structure,
however, so that the tax rules under Option 2.3 continue, the tax results
will be as follows:
HOMESTATE TAX-YEAR Ill-OPTION

Taxable
Income
$ 4,000
8,000
18,000

X
Y
4

Tax
$ 1,000
2,000
6,180

3.1

Effective Rate of Tax
Taxable
Net
Income
Income
25.0%
16.7%
25.0
20.0
34.3
30.9

Marginal
Tax Rate
25%
25
46

B

48,000

19,980

41.6

40.0

46

C

108,000
Total $186,000

47,580
$76,740

44.1
41.3

43.3
39.2

46

By failing to account for inflation, a significant shift in tax burden
results from income adjustments that otherwise would restore all individuals to their previous economic condition. Although two dollars of
Year III income replace one of Year II income, Homestate's tax revenue
more than doubles. The Year III revenue is almost 2.3 times that of
Year 11.88 In the process, all taxpayers suffer an increase in the effective
rate of tax on net income. The rate of increase, however, varies from
100% for X to 6.9% for C, with rates of increase of 33.3% for Y, 54.5% for
A and 17.6% for B.8 9
2. Adjusting the PersonalExemption and Step Point-Option3.2
Two elements in the Homestate tax system, stated in dollars unadjusted for inflation, account for the tax increase in real terms: the $2,000
personal exemption and the $10,000 "step point" in the rate schedule.
If Homestate doubled these numbers to accommodate the impact of in88

Compare the result to Option 2.3, supra table accompanying note 76 (revenues of

$33,760 rise to $76,740).
89 Se, id
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flation, the tax system would impose the same comparative burdens in
Year III as were seen in Year II under Option 2.3. 90
HOMESTATE TAX-YEAR III-OPTION 3.2

X
Y
A
B
C
Total

Taxable
Income
$ 2,000
6,000
16,000
46,000
106,000
$176,000

Tax
$ 500
1,500
4,000
16,960
44,560
$67,520

Effective Rate of Tax
Taxable
Net
Income
Income
25.0%
8.3%
25.0
15.0
25.0
20.0
36.9
33.9
42.0
40.5
38.4
34.4

Marginal
Tax Rate
25%
25
25
46
46

If Homestate's legislature adopts Option 3.2 rather than Option 3.1
for Year III, it could describe the change as producing a tax cut of
$9,220.91 Under Option 3.2, neither Homestate nor any of its taxpayers
has changed its position from what it was under Option 2.3:
Homestate's revenues constitute the same percentage of net income as
before and each taxpayer faces the same effective ratio and marginal
rate. 92 Homestate's legislators, nevertheless, might describe the shift to
Option 3.2 from Option 3.1 as government largesse.
3.

An Across-the-BoardRate Cut-Option 3.3

The distribution of the tax cut under Option 3.2 differs substantially from the result that would obtain if Homestate instead adjusted
Option 3.1 through an across-the-board cut in the tax rates. To illustrate the latter, consider an across-the-board rate cut of 12% that retains
a personal exemption of $2,000, and imposes a marginal rate of 22% on
the first $10,000, and 40.5% on the balance. This new schedule reduces
taxes from Option 3.1 by $9,180, almost the same amount as Option
3.2, 93 but affects Homestate's taxpayers differently.
90
91

See id
Under Option 3.1 Homestate's total tax revenue would be $76,740; under Option 3.2
the figure is $67,520.
92
Compare supra table accompanying note 76 with supra table following note 90. The
following table compares the effective rate of tax on net income under Option 2.3 with that
under Options 3.1 and 3.2.
Option 2.3
Option 3.1
Option 3.2

93

X
Y
A
B
C
See supra note 91 and

8.3%
16.6%
15.3
20.0
20.0
30.9
34.0
40.0
40.5
43.3
accompanying text.

8.3%
15.3
20.0
34.0
40.5
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HOMESTATE TAX-YEAR III--OPTION 3.3

Taxable
Income
X
$ 4,000
Y
8,000
A
18,000
B
48,000
C
108,000
Total $186,000

Effective Rate of Tax
Taxable
Net
Income
Income
22.0%
14.7%
22.0
17.6
30.2
27.2
36.6
35.2
38.8
38.1
36.3
34.5

Tax
$ 880
1,760
5,440
17,590
41,890
$67,560

COMPARISON OF OPTIONs

X
Y
A

AND

3.3

Dollar Change
in Tax From
3.2 to 3.3
$ 380
260

Percentage Change
in Effective Rate
on Net Income
+6.4
+2.6

1,440
630
-2,670

+7.2
+1.3
-2.4

B

C
Total

3.2

$

40

Marginal
Tax Rate
22.0%
22.0
40.5
40.5
40.5

+0.1

Both Options 3.2 and 3.3 reduce each person's tax from the Option
3.1 levels. C fares significantly better in absolute dollars under Option
3.3; his after-tax income is $2,670 greater than under Option 3.2. The
other four taxpayers do substantially worse in absolute dollars and in
effective rate of tax on net income, with A suffering the greatest increase
in tax burden. Recall that Option 2.3 represented a departure from the
Year I starting point, and had the least desirable effects on the lowerincome taxpayers. 94 Option 3.3 pushes further in this direction.
B.

The Rate Changes in the 1981 Act

The 1981 Act sought to neutralize the effects of inflation in two
ways. First, it enacted fixed multiyear tax cuts through 1984 based on
across-the-board rate reductions. These cuts began almost immediately. 95 Second, the 1981 Act mandated indexing, commencing in 1985,
for rate brackets, the zero bracket amount, and the personal
exemption.96
The 1981 Act, in essence, adopted an initial response similar to Option 3.3, phasing in an Option 3.2-like structural adjustment for years
94
95
96

See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1981).
Id. §§ 1(f), 63(d); id. § 151 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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after 1984. The latter change, because of its delayed impact, remains
vulnerable to subsequent congressional shifts in a way that the already
implemented cuts do not.
The rate cuts implemented the proposal for across-the-board tax
reductions endorsed by the President. Their form assertedly met the
effective-rate criterion of fairness, that all rates decline proportionately:
the reductions are described as an average 23% across-the-board reduction. 9 7 This average, however, conceals some important variations."
When fully phased in, the lowest marginal rate dropped 21.4%, while
the highest declined by a third more, 28.6%. Apart from these extremes,
in eleven of the sixteen prior-law brackets the rates dropped between
22% and 24%. For the five remaining brackets, the rate in one fell by
21%, in two by 25%, and in the next-to-highest bracket, by 26.8%.98
Moreover, the reduction in the top rate became effective immediately in
1981, while the other rate reductions were phased in over the 33-month
period from 1981 to 1984. As a result of the timing differences, the favoritism toward higher-bracket taxpayers suggested by the differing rate
changes is even more pronounced in the transitional years, 1982 and
1983.
The effect of the cut in the top bracket, from 70% to 50%, is further
complicated by its relationship to two categories of income--earned income and capital gain income. Prior law had applied a maximum 50%
rate to earned income. 99 A reduction in the top rate to 50% thus benefitted certain high-bracket taxpayers little or not at all.1°° On the other
hand, the 1981 Act had the effect of cutting the tax rate on net capital
gains from the prior maximum of 28% to 20%, without dealing explicitly
with the mechanics of capital gain taxation. The percentage decline in
the maximum capital gain rate, 28.6%, exceeds the average 23% acrossthe-board decline. The dollar impact per dollar of capital gains is
smaller, however, than that of the rate cut for ordinary income. The
actual effect of the 1981 change at the highest income levels thus varies
depending on the composition of the income.
Although the inflation-adjustment rationale explains most of the
effective rate cuts, it fails to justify any reduction in the highest rate.
Bracket creep does not affect taxpayers with significant income above
97 S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981).
98 Compare Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101(a), 95 Stat.
172, 176.
99 I.R.C. § 1348 (1976),reptaledby Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 9734, § 101(c)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 178-79.
100 The joint committee staff illustrations of the effects of the 1981 Act rate cuts show
little benefit accruing in the top brackets through the simple expedient of treating all income
as earned income throughout the calculations. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., IsT SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX
AcT OF 1981, at 23-26, tables IV-I to 4 (Comm. Print 1981).
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the step point for the highest -bracket. Prior to 1981, those taxpayers
confronted flat rather than graduated marginal rates and there is no
need to adjust their marginal tax rates for the purpose of offsetting inflation. Nevertheless, the 1981 Act reduces the rate applicable to all income in the top bracket. The second theme of the 1981 Act,
productivity incentives, doubtless supplied an impetus for these rate
cuts. High marginal rates arguably discourage "additional work effort"
and encourage "tax avoidance."' 1 1 Implicit in this choice, as noted ear102
lier, is a tradeoff with progressivity objectives.
The failure of the 1981 Act to make initial adjustments to the personal exemption and zero bracket amount furthers the disproportionate
impact of the rate cuts. Although inflation erodes the value of these
deductions, the 1981 tax cuts incorporate no adjustments to compensate
for such erosion. As demonstrated by the contrast between Options 3.3
and 3.2, across-the-board rate cuts favor higher income taxpayers in
10 3
comparison to fully indexed reductions.
An additional consequence of the failure to adjust the personal exemption and the ZBA derives from their gatekeeper function. If real
incomes remain constant and nominal incomes rise while the threshold
dollar amounts remain the same, individuals formerly outside the income tax system will find themselves above the minimum return-filing
and tax-paying amounts. In other words, bracket creep into the tax system will persist. As a secondary effect, the ZBA will cover the itemized
deductions of fewer taxpayers. Deductions too will rise in nominal
amount along with inflation, and more taxpayers will find it advantageous to claim itemized deductions. The added costs in complexitynumbers of additional formi to fill out, file and audit-will be significant as the percentage of itemizing taxpayers rises.
Two recent changes in frequently claimed itemized deductions may
reflect the reduced ability of the ZBA to serve its second function as an
alternative to itemization. The 1981 Act phases in over several years a
provision that allows nonitemizers to claim the charitable contribution
deduction. 104 Relatively low dollar limits in the first year of the transition period render the deduction, for at least those years, similar to an
additional dollar deduction for nonitemizers, not unlike a direct increase
in the ZBA.' 0 5 When the full charitable contribution deduction for
nonitemizers is phased in, however, the ZBA will simply offset a smaller
bundle of itemized deductions. In effect, the charitable contribution
101

Id at 18.

See supra notes 74, 87 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
104
I.R.C. §§ 170(1), 63(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
105
For 1982 and 1983 the maximum deduction a nonitemizer may claim is $25. For
1984 the amount increases to $75. Id § 170(i) (corresponding to Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No., 97-34, § 121(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241).
102
103
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deduction change recognizes the reduced value of the ZBA by according
it a more modest tax tradeoff against other deductions.
A second change involves the deductions for medical expenses and
6
casualty losses. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 198210
10 7
increases the adjusted gross income floor to 5% for the former
and
1
8
imposes a new 10% adjusted gross income floor for the'latter. 0 These
changes are expected to make it more difficult for higher income taxpayers to claim these deductions. Again, the change seems to acknowledge
the reduced value of the ZBA, this time by cutting down the value of
the deductions the ZBA replaces.
Two relatively new provisions recognize implicitly the inadequacy
of the present Code thresholds for taxability by creating independent
ones. The Revenue Act of 1978 included some unemployment compensation benefits in gross income. °9 No inclusion occurs unless the unemployment compensation plus adjusted income, with certain
modifications, exceeds a base amount. The initial base amount of
$20,000 for an individual and $25,000 for a married couple filing joint
returns was reduced in 1982 to $12,000 and $18,000 respectively. 10
New section 86, taxing portions of social security benefits for the first
time, adopts a similar mechanism with base amounts of $25,000 and
$32,000.11 The objective in each case-to avoid taxation of government benefits received by those in need--obviously could not be
reached by reliance on the personal exemption and the ZBA.
Finally, by 1981 the combined personal exemption and ZBA failed
even to insulate poverty-level families from federal income tax. The
poverty level for 1981 was $9,287 for a family of four. 1 2 Such a family
would have enjoyed a combined ZBA and personal exemptions totaling
$7,400, leaving $1,887 subject to income tax, for a tax liability of
$261.113
The 1981 "across-the-board" rate cuts disfavored lower income taxpayers and provided a disproportionately large reduction to wealthier
taxpayers. The pattern of rate cuts is not rendered any more even106
107
108
109
110

Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
Id § 202(b)(1), 96 Stat. 324, 421 (codified at I.R.C. § 213(a)).
Id § 203(a), 96 Stat. 324, 422 (codified at I.R.C. § 165(h) (West Supp. 1983)).
I.R.C. § 85 (Supp. V 1981).

112

U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT SER. P-60, No. 138,

Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 611 (a), 96
Stat. 324, 706.
111 The Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 121(c), 97 Stat. 65, 80.
CHARACTERISTICs OF POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1981, at 181, table A2.

113 The text ignores the earned income credit, limited under I.R.C. § 43(b) (Supp. V
1981) to $88, and employee employment taxes of $617.59. For 1982 the poverty level for a
family of four rose to $9,862. The income tax liability was $305, the earned income credit
$17, and the employment tax $661. See A. Feld, Our Tax on the Poor, Wash. Post, Aug. 11,
1983, at A23, col. 1.
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handed when viewed as an adjustment to compensate for past and anticipated inflation. Inflation-based relief, if it will come at all, 114 is not
scheduled until 1985. Much of the disproportionality is attributable to
the failure to adjust fixed dollar deductions related to the measure of
subsistence. The failure to alter the personal exemption and ZBA will
sweep new taxpayers into the system. Finally, when set in the context of
the historical pattern from 1939 to the present, the 1981 changes reflect
some alteration in the assumptions underlying our progressive rate
structure. This last point is analyzed below.iS
IV.
PLACING THE

1981 ACT

IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The World War II tax changes converted the income tax from a
levy that primarily affected a small part of the population to a tax that
reaches most American households. 116 Not only did the tax rates increase, but the rate structure became much steeper. In addition, the
personal exemption declined sharply, with two significant effects. The
decline enlarged the taxpaying population severalfold and converted
the tax from a tax on discretionary income to a tax on some nondiscretionary income as well. 1 7 As a companion measure, the standard deduction entered the tax structure.' 18 These changes were still part of the
income tax structure in 1979, three and a half decades after World War
II.
The 1981 Act changes cut back on several of these trends. The
$100 billion tax cut led to reduced marginal rates for taxpayers in every
bracket. The failure to adjust the personal exemption and the ZBA for
inflation, however, shifted the burden of taxation down the income
scale.
The four criteria for evaluating rate changes are helpful in analyzing the shifts in tax burdens from 1939 to the present. Tables I through
IV'1 9 summarize the differences between 1939 and 1979, and extend the
comparison to 1984, the year when the 1981 changes will take full effect.
These comparisons will establish that the 1981 Act rate cuts disfavored
lower income taxpayers, in contravention of the trend of the previous
forty years, and in direct contradiction to the rhetoric surrounding the
1981 "across-the-board" rate changes.
114

See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.

115 See infra Section IVB.
116 See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
119 Nineteen eighty-four data are based on 1979 income levels adjusted for an assumed
inflation of 33 1/3% from 1979 to 1984.
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Historical Comparison Under the Four Criteria
1. Marginal-RateComparison

Table I exhibits the following concerning marginal rates. Although
the 1979 marginal rates exceed those for 1939 at every income level except the top one, 120 the ratio of comparison between 1979 and 1939 is
fairly constant at around 5.5 to 1. This ratio suggests that the 1979 rate
schedule bears a close similarity to that of 1939. The 1979 schedule,
however, is much steeper than the 1939 schedule, rising quickly to a 70%
peak rate on incomes over $106,000. The 1939 schedule reached its
highest rate (78%) only after net income exceeded $5,000,000.
All but one of the 1984 marginal rates lie below their 1979 counterparts. The ratio of rate decline, however, is significant. Except for the
lowest bracket ($6,538 in 1979 income), none of the 1984 marginal rates
on incomes below $52,000 (in 1979 dollars) is less than 87% of its 1979
counterpart. 12 1 After the $52,000 mark, this percentage declines to a
steady 71% on incomes over $150,000 (1979 dollars). Taxpayers at the
upper end of the scale thus enjoyed a disproportionate share of the benefits of the marginal rate decreases.
Because of its steeper rate structure, the 1979 schedule bears a more
attenuated relationship than the 1939 schedule to a basic theoretical
support for progressivity in tax rates-declining marginal utility of
money. The 1984 rate schedule continues this trend by reaching its
highest marginal rate even sooner than did the 1979 schedule.
One basic element in the argument for progressivity is a presumption of declining marginal utility of money; that is, the loss of a dollar of
income provides less deprivation to an individual if he has many dollars
than if he has few. 122 Therefore, to minimize the aggregate reduction in
utility to the members of society, any new tax burden should fall more
heavily on individuals with large amounts of income and more lightly
on those with lesser amounts. Although individual utility curves may
differ, a relative-sacrifice theory in support of progressivity in income
taxation rests to some extent on this idea of declining marginal utility of
money.
At the lowest income levels, a tax system accommodates the declining marginal utility of money through low or zero rates on the income
used to buy specified minimum levels of food, clothing, shelter,
120 Comparative references for this section are illustrated in Table I. Because the 1939
schedule did not reach its peak until $5,000,000 adjusted gross ihcome (corresponding to
$26,150,000 in 1979), it is a somewhat imperfect measure of comparison. The far more gradual rise in rate progressivity in 1939, however, does correspond to a reasonable theory of the
declining marginal utility of money. See inta note 124 and accompanying text.
121 The lowest 1984 bracket is 83% of the 1979 level.
122 See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 72, at 40-42. The idea that money can have a
declining marginal utility is a controversial one, as the authors note.
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and other goods and services.' 23 The 1939 rate structure reflected this
goal by providing a $1,000 personal exemption and by imposing a 4%
rate that extended to net incomes up to $4,000. Over 80% of all individual tax returns filed incurred tax at or below this rate. 24 In 1979, the
ZBA and the personal exemption excluded $3,300 for a single individual. The lowest scheduled rate was 14% and it taxed the first $1,100 of
taxable income over the ZBA; 76.8% of all returns filed encountered
higher marginal rates. 125 The lowest rate in 1984 will be 11%126 and at

least as many returns as in 1979 will encounter higher rates.
Again, at the higher income levels the 1939 rate structure arguably
was more related to the marginal utility of money than the 1979 or 1984
structures. If money has declining marginal utility, the decline probably is gradual over a large income interval. Under this theory, the 1979
marginal rate schedule, which reached its top rate at $106,000, or the
1984 schedule which reaches its top rate at $79,500127, hardly reflects a
studied matching of tax burdens to the marginal utility of money.
Taxes will increase faster, and after-tax income will decline faster under
the 1981 Act, than under a tax structure based on a plausible theory of
declining marginal utility.
2. Effective-Rate Comparzson
Table II analyzes the second criterion, effective rates, and demonstrates a somewhat different perspective. The ratios of the 1979 effective
rates to their 1939 counterparts remain relatively uniform at about 6 to
1 in the middle income ranges, but decline somewhat for the higher
incomes. At the top of the rate schedule, taxpayers actually do better in
1979, by reason of the compression of the rates and the slightly higher
1939 top rate.' 2 8 This result parallels marginal-rate comparisons for the
two years. The comparison ratio for lower income taxpayers' effective
rates, however, is relatively higher than was the marginal-rate comparison. This configuration suggests that the 1979 tax burden has shifted
down the income scale, an impression that is reinforced by the observation that the data do not include low adjusted gross income taxpayers
123 When the tax base is conceived of as consisting of discretionary income rather than
net income, a sufficient amount of net income to cover subsistence is not subject to tax. Se
supra notes 33, 28 and accompanying text.
124

U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME

]FOR 1939 (PART 1) 16 (1942). The percentage figure in the text is extrapolated from the
table.
125 STATISTICS OF INCOME 1979, upra note 48, at 96, table 3.13.
126 I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1981).
127 These numbers reflect the top bracket amount for unmarried individuals, id § 1(c),
reduced by the $2,300 ZBA built into the rate table.
128 Comparative references for the section are illustrated in Table II.
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for 1979 whose 1939 counterparts incurred no tax liability.129 In addition, the 1979 effective-rate comparison ratio reaches its peak at a point
slightly above the 1979 median income, then declines. 130 The effectiverate comparison thus suggests that the middle and lower range taxpayers suffered proportionately greater burdens from the income tax increases, than did taxpayers not formerly subject to tax.
The 1981 changes shifted the tax burden further down the income
scale by granting significant relief primarily to upper income taxpayers.
At the lowest income level, the 1981 tax cuts actually lead to a higher
effective rate for the same real income as in 1979. By the $50,000 income mark, effective rates will have declined only 10% from 1979 to
1984. From the $50,000 mark upward, comparative effective rates decrease rapidly to 72% of the 1979 level. Again, the data do not even
account for citizens who were not included as taxpayers in 1979, but
who will become taxpayers in future years as inflation pushes their in13
come above the ZBA level. '
3.

32
The After- Tax Income Comparison1

Table III concerns the third measure, change in after-tax income,
and presents a significantly different picture of the 1939 to 1979
changes. The lowest income levels exhibit a relatively small decrease in
after-tax income from 1939 to 1979. As income rises to $30,000 (1939
dollars, equivalent to $156,900 in 1979 dollars), the decline in after-tax
income becomes much more acute. 133 Based on the after-tax income
criterion, it appears that the additional tax burdens in 1979 fell most
heavily on taxpayers well above the median level income.
The 1981 changes reverse the forty-year trend to some extent. Although one would anticipate that after-tax income would increase after
an across-the-board rate cut, this is not so for the taxpayer at the bottom
of the income scale. At the higher levels, however, the more after-tax
income an individual enjoyed to begin with, the greater the relative increase added by the 1981 Act. At income levels under $52,300 (1979
dollars, equivalent to $69,733 in 1984 dollars), after-tax income rises
129 For example, an individual with income of $800 in 1939 would make $4,240 in inflation-adjusted 1979 dollars. Such an individual was untaxed in 1939 because of the $1,000
personal exemption. In 1979, the personal exemption and ZBA would exclude $3,300 from
taxation and the remaining $940 would be taxed at a 14% marginal rate.
130 See supra note 32.
131 See supra note 129. Again, inflation will draw a person with adjusted gross income of
$3,000 in 1979 into the tax schedule in 1984 (with 1984 adjusted gross income of $4,000).
132 Comparative references for this section are illustrated in Table III.
133 Note, however, that the gap in after-tax income does not narrow until a taxpayer
reaches an exceedingly high level of income. The figures in the low and intermediate range
best reflect the comparative positions of the vast majority of taxpayers in both 1939 and 1979.
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less than 5.5% from 1979 to 1984. Only the taxpayers with incomes
134
above this level will realize significant increases in after-tax income.
The 1981 Act thus has mitigated the apparent harsh after-tax effect on
the upper income taxpayers of the post-1939 rate changes.
4. After-Tax Discretionay Income Comparison
Table IV dealing with the final criterion, after-tax discretionary income, yields an intermediate view of the changes from 1939 to 1979.
The calculations equate the $1,000 personal exemption in 1939
(equivalent to $5,230 in 1979 dollars and $6,973 in 1984 dollars) with a
subsistence level of income. 135 After factoring out this subsistence income, the changes from 1939 to 1979 appear less drastic than under the
straight after-tax income comparison.
At the lowest income level, after-tax discretionary income decreased by 37.1%. In intermediate income ranges the decrease is less
severe; less than 30% for incomes up to $32,688 in 1979 dollars. In the
highest two levels in the table, the rate of decline in after-tax discretionary income from 1939 to 1979 accelerates. Using the discretionary income measure, changes in tax rates from 1939 to 1979 appear to have
placed the greatest burden on taxpayers at the low and high ends of the
income scale.
A comparison of 1979 discretionary income, adjusted for inflation,
and 1984 discretionary income shows some alteration of the 1939 to
1979 trend. 136 At the lowest income level, discretionary income declines
even though marginal rates will be lower. Moving up the schedule to
higher incomes, taxpayers will enjoy an increase in discretionary income. By the fifth entry in the table, however, representing $43,584 in
1984 adjusted gross income, discretionary income will rise 3.3% from
1979. As the data illustrate, discretionary income rises rapidly over 1979
levels only for those taxpayers with incomes over $55,000 (1984 adjusted
gross income). Near the top of the scale, high income taxpayers will
enjoy increases in discretionary income of well over 50% from 1979
levels.
B.

Analyzing the Changes from a Historical Perspective

The ten adjusted gross income levels tested in these tables when
divided into three groups-the three lowest, the three highest and the
134 The disparity in after-tax incomes does not necessarily reflect unfairness to upper
income taxpayers when an after tax discretionary-income criterion is used. In addition, a
greater after-tax burden on upper income taxpayers may reflect the social policies that led to
a progressive rate structure in the first instance.
135 This level of subsistence, arbitrarily selected to facilitate discussion of discretionary
income, is not intended to foreclose inquiry as to the proper level for subsistence.
136 Comparative references for this section are illustrated in Table IV.
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middle four-highlight the points of agreement and disagreement between the four criteria.
For the highest group, all four criteria show a decline in added tax
burden from 1939 to 1979 as income increases. Indeed the highest income, representing the top of the 1939 rate scale, is better off by every
criterion in 1979 than in 1939.
For the middle group, the marginal and effective rates have increased by relatively equivalent factors from 1939 to 1979. The other
two criteria, however, show an increase in relative burden for members
of this group that rises with income.
For the three classes at the lowest income level, the marginal-rate
and the after-tax income criteria show a rise in relative tax burden with
income from 1939 to 1979, implying that lower income taxpayers
avoided a proportionate increase in tax burden. This is not the case,
however, under the effective-rate and discretionary-income criteria,
which show ratios declining with income and therefore higher relative
burdens on lower incomes.
Under all four criteria, the 1981 Act rate reductions produce a
skewed distribution of the tax cut when adjustments for inflation are
considered as the motive for the cuts. The beneficiaries of the form of
the tax cut selected are those in the highest income categories. Under
the effective-rate and after-tax income measures the lowest income taxpayers receive least favorable treatment. Under the discretionary income measure, the 1981 tax cuts extend the skewed distribution of
benefits even further up the income scale. Taxpayers with less than
$50,000 in 1984 adjusted gross income will see little benefit from the rate
cuts.
In comparison to the relative changes in tax burden since 1939, the
1981 Act continues some trends and reverses others. The marginal rate
schedule grew much steeper from 1939 to 1979, and leveled off at a
lower income level. The 1981 marginal rate schedule is even steeper,
and levels off even sooner. Under the effective-rate criterion, the 1939 to
1979 changes shifted burdens more heavily onto low and moderate income taxpayers; the 1981 Act continues this trend. Analysis of after-tax
income tells a different story of disproportionately heavy burdens on upper income taxpayers below the highest bracket. The 1981 Act can be
seen as redressing much of the previous change and restoring a distribution of tax burdens closer to the earlier levels. Even under this view,
however, the 1981 Act fails to make a principled adjustment; it overrewards the wealthy and it fails to remove from the tax system those
additional taxpayers brought into it by the reductions in the effective
personal exemption. Measured by discretionary income, the 1939 to
1979 period produced a more complex change, overburdening taxpayers
at the bottom of the income scale and in its upper middle range and
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benefitting the higher bracket taxpayers. The 1981 Act provides significant relief from this historical trend only to taxpayers in the highest
income classes.
CONCLUSION

No theory to determine the annual amount that each household
should contribute towards the common weal enjoys wide acceptance.
Nevertheless, the individual income tax purports to make such determinations. These determinations necessarily involve some arbitrariness
but they have been tolerated as reasonable.
When changes occur in tax rules, however, a basis for comparison
emerges between what has gone before and the new allocation of the tax
burden. This article has articulated four criteria-marginal rate, effective rate, after-tax income, and after-tax discretionary income-for assessing the effects of tax changes and it has applied these criteria to the
1981 Act tax rate reductions. It compared the new tax schedule to a
recent base, the income tax in effect for 1979, and to a much earlier
base, the income tax as it applied in 1939, before the significant World
War II structural changes.
Under all four criteriathe 1981 tax reductions favor high income
taxpayers and disfavor low income taxpayers. Even on its own termsreduction in the marginal rates applicable to taxpayers-the Act provided larger cuts in the high income ranges than in the lowest range.
Perhaps more significantly, the Act neglected to adjust the personal exemption and the zero bracket amount, both of which have far greater
significance for lower income taxpayers. The effects of this failure
emerge not only in applying the criterion of discretionary after-tax income, which takes explicit account of these deductions and exemptions,
but also when relative changes in effective tax rates and in after-tax income are considered.

